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STATE TRADING IN HISTORY AND THEORY*
JOHN N. HAZARDt
State conduct of foreign trade is a major concern of midcentury economists,
lawyers, government officials, and private merchants. Its most ardent opponents
have suffered defeats, and even the United States Government is considering resort
to it as an instrument of the cold war. Writing in December 1958, James Reston, of
The New York Times, has found it possible to quote an anonymous high official in
Washington in a warning,1
We have been discussing quietly inside our own Government for six months the need to
establish an overseas trade monopoly to compete with the Soviet monopoly on equal terms,
but this is so foreign to our normal way of doing business that we dare not mention it in
public.
International conferences of governments' and of individual scholars' have been
wrestling with the unresolved problems presented by the expansion of state trading.
The concern of theoreticians and practical men alike is mounting, and the problems
are many, as evidenced by the articles in this symposium devoted to the subject. What
began to be important years ago, but without attracting attention, has been brought
since World War II to the front lines of the clash of ideologies between the private-
enterprise economies and those flying the flag of communism. Today, officials even
of the major bastion defending the private-enterprise system are contemplating
risking a hole in the walls to compete more effectively with Soviet traders seeking to
expand the influence of the Soviet Union and of Communist China throughout the
world.
The problems of today are far from those of the early Middle Ages, when state
trading may be said to have been born. An economist has written that, "the trade of
Venice was organized upon a political basis. It could almost be said that the
Venetian state was a company of merchants of whom the Doge was the chief."4
The history of the intervening centuries3 is not the concern of those seeking
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a trace of state trading, for they witnessed the predominance of private merchants,
working to further their private interest through devices such as the fairs, the
Hanseatic League, and finally the great companies with fighting forces and quasi-
sovereign power. The state taxed and even designated the regions of trade. Its
explorers opened new continents, and its galleons protected the trade routes; but it
was not itself the monopoly buyer and seller with which state trading is today
associated. It was not until the industrial revolution had become far advanced,
with the attendant concern of economic theorists for new methods to cope with its
aftermath, that state trading appeared as a panacea. It was linked with other ele-
ments of a strengthened state in the minds of those who called themselves socialists,
as part of their plan for economic development under state auspices. The disciples
of "laissez faire" remained so numerous, however, and the expanding capitalist
economy so fruitful that it was the scholar, and not the government official, who
bothered with such ideas.
World War I brought an end to many dreams, among them the possibility of
winning a war without mobilizing the key elements of the economy as well as its
military forces. Englishmen and finally Americans had to abandon their concept of
"laissez faire" in certain areas to meet the demands of the crisis. Economists have
noted that familiar views persisted, but practice changed perceptibly, so that the
state's role was enlarged, despite formal obeisance to liberal principles. Purchasing
missions on government account appeared in the great markets of the world. The
Tsar of Russia bought munitions in the West, and the firm of Morgan financed the
French Government in its commercial operations in the United States. The retreat
from private enterprise was not limited to the Continent. The United States thought
it necessary to requisition the railways and to form a commercial fleet to be man-
aged by the War Shipping Board. Yet, governments still relied upon the price
system to obtain the goods they required. The War Shipping Board waived its right
to claim sovereign immunity in the courts.7 "Business as usual" is said to have
"expressed not only one's patriotic duty, but also abounding faith in the transitory
character of the whole episode."'
With the ending of World War I, the popular slogan of the time was "back to
normalcy," and for the Western world, state trading was laid to rest as a necessary
evil of wartime, to be discarded as soon as international trade could be restored to the
long-proven methods of the private merchant, moving alone or in concert with his
fellows, about the markets of the world. State trading reverted to secondary con-
sideration, as an inconsequential mechanism of the commerce of the world, useful
to some nations seeking revenue for depleted treasuries through tapping the pockets
of salt-eaters, liquor-drinkers, and smokers via almost traditional state monopolies
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of salt, liquor, tobacco, and matches. State trading was not generally expected to be
important on any grander scale?
Into this commonly-accepted school of thought, which viewed state trading as:
an instrument in the arsenal of war, except for the occasional revenue-producing
tobacco, salt, or liquor monopoly, was thrust quite a different theoretical approach,
by the Russian Revolution of 1917. At first, the new approach caused little alarm.
The whole revolution seemed to be a transitory phase, which could be quarantined.
until it collapsed of its own weight or was conquered by elements loyal to the
prerevolutionary regime, helped at places by the Western powers.
Vladimir Ilyich Lenin, as the theoretician of the Russian Revolution, set the
stage for what was to follow. He declared,'0
Strengthen and regulate those state monopolies, which have already been put into effect
and then prepare the monopolization of foreign trade by the state; without this monopoliza-
tion we shall not be able to separate ourselves from foreign capital and from paying tribute.
In this concept, state trading became a companion of state production. Both seemed.
necessary to Lenin to achieve an economic organization suitable to the creation of a-
socialist and ultimately a communist society.
Lenin was not unchallenged, even within his own Communist Party, for some
of his colleagues thought that in the early stages of the new Soviet society, the new
Soviet state could protect its infant state industries as other nations protected their-
infant private industries-namely, by high tariffs. He lashed out at Nikolai Bukharin
to say,"
Bukharin does not see that no policy of tariffs can be effective in the imperialist epoch
when there is a monstrous difference between the poor countries and those of unbelievable-
wealth. Bukharin refers to protection by tariffs, failing to see that under the conditions:
referred to any one of the wealthiest countries can break down this protection.
The spectre of a giant cartel willing to sell its goods in the Soviet market at cut
prices so as to dominate the new Soviet state producers, even under a tariff set at
previously unimagined heights, haunted Lenin. Fearful as he was that the capitalists
sought not only to expand sales in the new Soviet market, but even to undermine-
the Bolsheviks by weakening their economic power, Lenin was strong in his deter-
mination to foster state trading. He was doing more than protecting infant in-
dustries. He was preparing the way for an infant society which he expected eventu-
ally to mature so as to win domination of the world. In this situation, state
trading was an instrument of the new Messiah, and its place in the Soviet arsenal of
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weapons was protected with all the emotion of one whose aim was world salvation,
not the narrower goal of economic profit. Only in this light can the Leninist posi-
tion be evaluated. No concession to Soviet power would loom large enough in
Lenin's eyes, nor in the eyes of those who have followed him, to be worth even
partial abandonment of the state monopoly of foreign trade.
It is against such a background that state trading was created by law as one
of the pillars of the new Soviet state. Lenin's decree of April 22, i918 declared,12
All foreign trade is nationalized. Contracts for the purchase or sale of all kinds of products
(the products of mines, of industry, of agriculture and others) with foreign governments
or individual enterprises abroad will be carried out in the name of the Russian Republic
by specially empowered organs. Apart from these organs every contract for trade, for
purchase or sale abroad is forbidden.
Stalin repeated Lenin's adamant position in defense of state trading at the height
of the New Economic Policy when an American delegation asked why he felt it
necessary to adhere to it at the same time that a neocapitalism had been authorized
for the domestic economy. In his retort, he said,13
the abolition of the monopoly of foreign trade would mean a retreat from the industrializa-
tion of the country, from the construction of new plants and factories, from the repair
of new plants and factories. This would mean for them the submergence of the U.S.S.R.
by goods from capitalist countries, the warping of our industry by virtue of its relative
weakness, an increase in the number of unemployed, a decline of the material position
of the working class, and a weakening of its economic and political position.
Stalin was thinking still in terms of protection of the new Soviet system from
enemies from without. He had not yet had the vision of state trading as a mighty
weapon in the struggle for men's minds throughout the world. When he sold
lumber or coal at dumping prices in foreign markets, he sought to get much-needed
foreign exchange so that he might buy precious foreign machines to modernize his
factories. He was not seeking to enter the foreign markets with a wedge to be
expanded later by political methods when the time was ripe. Not until after World
War II did this possibility open to Soviet leaders, to be exploited by Nikita Khrush-
chev with such effectiveness that state trading became of concern not only to private
merchants seeking to save their hard-earned places in foreign markets, but to foreign
office officials seeking to maintain alliances or to encourage neutrality in the mid-
century conflicts conducted on the governmental level to win friends.'
4
For the private-enterprise countries entering upon the interwar years, state trading
was as strongly opposed by the vocal elements as it was praised by the Soviets.
Private commerce between nations had to be restored to vigor. In this process, the
state had a duty to seek out markets for its merchants, even to create commercial
f2 [1918] Sob. Uzak. RSFSR, No. 23, item 432.
'3J. V. STALIN, Conversation with the First American Workers Delegation, Sept. 9, 1927, in
VoPRosY LENINIZMA [QusTioNs OF LENINISM] 179 (ioth ed. 1933).
"For an account of Soviet policy, as evidenced by trade statistics and reports, see JosEPH S. BERLINER,
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counselors in its embassies abroad to study markets and report back to boards of
trade and departments of commerce what seemed to be a good place to sell or to
buy. Yet, this was not state trading. The United States Government was not itself
to buy olive oil in Italy for sale in New York on the open market.
This view of the desirability of state withdrawal from participation in foreign
commerce, except as an aid to private merchants, was shaken, however, with the
Depression. There appeared practical men who began to think of state trading
not in Soviet terms of a means to further state absorption of the domestic producer
and in aid of state economic planning, but rather as a means of improving com-
parative advantage in international trade. Bulk buying was seen as a means of
obtaining low quotations from producers dazzled by enormous orders. State
trading provided the opportunity to increase the size of the orders placed abroad.
In a world in which currencies were becoming blocked in increasing numbers, state
trading facilitated the execution of barter deals through which critical materials
could be obtained without use of foreign exchange at all. Many decried these de-
partures from the classical form of international commerce, but to these critics there
was the reply that the crisis of the Great Depression was as much of a challenge as a
war, and departure was justified to save the state. It would be only a temporary
expedient until business could be resumed as usual.
A new element entered the debate, however, for in contrast to the war period,
there were now analysts who were not so sure that state trading was to be only a
temporary expedient. Charges began to be hurled against the state traders of the
private-enterprise world that they were but wolves in sheep's clothing. Some critics
feared that under the guise of temporary expediency, proponents of state trading
were seeking to prepare the way for ultimate introduction of a socialist system
which only a small minority would favor if they could understand what was hap-
pening.
Into this scene of growing scepticism of expressed motives came World War II.
The private-enterprise countries girded for action, and again they turned to state
trading, but they sought to avoid some of the practices of World War I. The
United States nationalized no railways, although it did requisition ships. This time,
private enterprisers were, wherever possible, to remain as administrators, and the
state was to serve only as coordinator in the war effort, setting priorities, establishing
fixed prices, fixing specifications, and even dictating order boards, but not itself being
the entrepreneur.
To this policy of restraint, there were exceptions in critical areas.' 5 In the United
States, the production of synthetic rubber became a state monopoly, and the secret
manufacture of atomic fuels was, of course, a state activity. In the foreign trade
area, the state also found it necessary to participate directly to keep critical materials
from the hands of the enemy when these materials appeared on foreign markets.'0
" Sec STEPHEN ENKE & VIRGIL SALERA, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIcs 437 et seq. (1951).
" Sc FOREIGN ECONOMIC ADMINISTRATION, REPORT TO CONGRESS ON OPERATIONS 15 (1944).
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Only a -government could function in the neutral Turkish market to keep the Ger-
mans from buying hazel nuts from which they could extract precious oil for
mechanical fuses. Each of the foreign powers buying in the American market to
equip their military machines created purchasing commissions which acted for
the state in obtaining the sinews of war.
The United Kingdom established a pattern with its United Kingdom Com-
mercial Corporation, through which it conducted preclusive buying operations to
hamper the enemy, and with its British Purchasing Commission in Washington, it
created a headquarters for its war purchasing effort, as did the other allied powers.
The last of these to be formed was the Government Purchasing Commission of the
U.S.S.R. in the U.S.A. T
Those who had studied Soviet practices saw in this last .something of a different
organization than the agencies called purchasing commissions created by the other
powers. Ever since United States recognition of the Soviet Union in 1933, the
Soviet authorities had been hoping to establish in the United States an agency
similar to that established in most other countries with which the Soviet Union
had diplomatic relations-namely, a state-trading delegation. This desire had been
resisted by United States Government authorities because it would have involved
recognition of some measure of diplomatic status for the commercial agents of the
Soviet Union who would comprise its staff. In every country in which Soviet state-
trading delegations had been established, the Soviet authorities had requested diplo-
matic standing for the chief of the delegation, immunity of the premises, the
right to use cipher, and immunity from suit. In each case, the establishment had
been completed under the terms of a commercial treaty setting forth the extent to
which the receiving power was willing to accede to Soviet requests1 8  The authori-
ties of the United States wanted none of this, for they felt that the delegation would
be an entering wedge for state trading within the American market, and they feared
that pleas of immunity might create a situation from which American merchants
could be exploited.19
In view of United States Government refusal even to consider the presence of a
Soviet trade delegation in Washington, the Soviet authorities had been forced to
content themselves with continuation of a device established in 1924, during the
period of nonrecognition of the Soviet Government, to serve as an agency through
which trade with the Soviet Union could be carried on. It took the form of a New
York corporation, entitled the Amtorg Trading Corporation, in which Soviet For-
eign Trade Ministry officials held all the stock, but which, as a domestic corpora-
" For an account of the United States-Soviet Union relationship, see E. R. STErrswus, JR., LEND-
LEASE, WEAPoN FOR VicronY cc. 19-20 (1944).
"
8 For examples of the provisions of such treaties, see T. A. TitAcouzlo, THE SOVIET UNION AND
INTERNATIONAL LAW 182, 183 (1935).
"°An example of nongovernmental thinking at the time of recognition of the Soviet Union by the
United States is to be found in AmERIcAN FOUNDATION, THE UNITED STATES AND THE SovIET UNION: A
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don, was subject to all New York laws. There could be no thought of immunity,
either in court or to state or federal regulation.
The war situation presented the Soviet Government with an opportunity for
change. They began their purchasing for war purposes in the United States after
the German attack upon them. As a result of the German attack, the prohibitions
of the Hider-Stalin Pact era were lifted in the United States, and the Amtorg Trading
Corporation began to function vigorously again. When the Soviet Union was
declared a beneficiary of the Lend-Lease Act on November 7, 1941 by President
Franklin D. Roosevelt,20 the Amtorg mechanism soon evidenced its inadequacy for
the new, greatly increased supply task which it was called upon to perform. Edward
R. Stettinius, as Lend-Lease Administrator, called in the Amtorg officials, together
with the officials of the Soviet Embassy, and advised that a purchasing commission
more nearly in the form of those established by the other allied powers be created
so that there might be within it Army and Navy supply officers, and not just the
peacetime commercial agents of the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Trade. The last
had shown themselves incapable of casting aside the peacetime restrictions placed
upon them by strict Soviet laws requiring minute inspection of every item and un-
ceasing negotiation for lower prices; yet, a less commercial attitude was necessary if
the goods were to be moved swiftly in the vast quantities required by war.
Soon after the establishment of the new Soviet Government Purchasing Com-
mission in Washington, a Soviet Major General of the Air Force and a Soviet Vice
Admiral who was a specialist on munitions arrived to assume its direction, but
some of the former Amtorg officials remained at their sides. All were subordinate
to the long-time specialist on foreign trade in Moscow-namely, Anastas Mikoyan-
and he soon tried out his luck. He sent his subordinates to see Mr. Stettinius with
the request for information as to whether it could be anticipated that the Purchasing
Commission might become after the war a Soviet state-trading delegation. After
consultation with the permanent United States Government agencies concerned with
peacetime commerce, Stettinius had to inform his questioners that it was not antici-
pated that the United States Government would look with favor after the war
upon the establishment of any state-trading delegations in the United States, and
the matter was not raised again.
While indicating its dislike of state-trading mechanisms, the United States Gov-
ernment found itself drawn increasingly into such operations. To conduct its pre-
clusive buying operations in concert with the British, it created a United States Com-
mercial Corporation.2 ' This state-trading agency was assigned the task of buying
essential raw materials available in countries accessible to Germany-namely, Turkey,
Spain, and Portugal. For administrative purposes, it was made subordinate to the
Board of Economic Welfare, and as such, it was transferred to the Office of Economic
20 55 STAT. 3x (194).
21 SeC HENRt CHALMERS, WORLD TRADE POLICIES: THE CHANGING PANORAMA, 1920-1953, at 273
(1953).
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Warfare when the Board was abolished in 1943. Later in the same year, it passed
to the Foreign Economic Administration when the Office of Economic Warfare was
absorbed by it.2
2
Not all state trading was in the hands of the United States Commercial Corpora-
tion, for by Executive Order of May 30, 1942, issued under the First War Powers
Act, the authority previously limited to the Secretary of the Navy to make emergency
purchases of war materials abroad and to have them admitted to the United States
free of duty was extended to various departments and agencies of the United States
Government. During the fiscal year 1943-44, $8oooooooo worth of foreign strategic
materials were bought with government funds under Foreign Economic Administra-
tion direction, exclusive of the preclusive buying program."
The United States Commercial Corporation bought materials for import under
War Production Board or War Food Administration directives, and these were then
allocated or sold to war industries or for other war purposes, in large part through
the facilities of the Reconstruction Finance Corporation and the Commodity Credit
Corporation.
The Foreign Economic Administrator, Leo P. Crowley, was kept acutely conscious
of the hostility to state trading by the foreign traders and bankers of the United States,
and he established an advisory committee of their representatives in an effort to
reduce their fears. 4 Almost all of them saw the necessity of war purchases by the
state, but many had little confidence in the motives of the Roosevelt administration,
which seemed to them to be utilizing the war emergency to establish a foothold for
state trading as an entering wedge for socialism. The Administrator's effort to
alleviate such fears was reflected in his report for 1944, in which he added a line
to his account of the United States Commercial Corporation. He said, "The facilities
and services of private importers were utilized at some stage of practically all For-
eign Economic Administration procurement operations."25  Later in the report, he
stated that the policy followed in foreign procurement has been to have the United
States Government engage in actual procurement only when the required amounts
of strategic commodities could not be bought effectively through ordinary com-
merical channels.
The back was broken by a last straw, which happened to be Italy. As Italy was
overrun by allied troops, it seemed obviously desirable to utilize some of her strategic
resources by purchasing them for the allied war effort; but it was also desirable from
a strategic point of view to aid in restoring the Italian economy so that economic dis-
location would not hamper the allied cause among people behind the allied lines.
This suggested purchase of other Italian commodities which were useful, but not
"' For texts of the executive orders concerned, see FOREIGN EcoNoMsIc ADMINISTRATIoN, op. cit. supra
note x6.
= See id. at 22.
2 4 Some of the concerns are reflected in UNITED STATEs AssocIATEs, INTERNATIONAL CHAMBER OF
COMMERCE, INCORPORATED, RELATIONS WITH STATE TRADING NATIONS (948). Also see Chalmers,
State Trading in Europe: Its Status and Prospects, J. Int'l Economy, Nov. 10, 1945, P. 3.
" FOREIGN EcoNoMIC ADMINISTRATION, op. cit. supra note z6, at 22.
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essential, to the strategic stock piles in the United States and the United Kingdom,
but for which there was a market which could produce funds with which the
Italians could commence rebuilding their war-torn economy.
Under this policy, there were added to the strategic materials a quantity of
Italian wines, essential oils, and what the Department of Commerce experts called
"a few other Italian specialties." 26 New York private traders were soon reporting
that the United States was going so far as to import Italian marble statuettes. These
purchases were made by the Allied Commission in Italy and consigned to the
United States Commercial Company as its agent. The strategic materials followed
the usual pattern of distribution according to War Production Board or War Food
Administration order, but the others were distributed among American importers for
sale in the open market. The funds obtained by such sales were paid over to the
United States for use of the Italian Government, less, of course, the private-trading
agent's commission. In this operation, there were the to-be-anticipated charges of
favoritism in the allocation of sales agencies by the United States Government to
private merchants, and this was held up as a further example of the undesirability of
government participation in the foreign trade operation.
President Roosevelt was fully aware bf the public relations perils of his state-
trading program. He had the Foreign Economic Administrator inform the French
Supply Mission and the Colonial Mission in 1944 that they were expected to deal
increasingly with private interests in the United States instead of with the United
States Government.2 7 Prior to that time, the Lend-Lease procurement channels for
nonmilitary items, most of which were under the Treasury Procurement Agency of
the United States Government, had been buying some nonwar items for the French
on a cash-reimbursable basis. This type of activity was to stop, and to make it
possible to return to private channels, the Foreign Economic Administration an-
nounced in December 1944 that for similar commodities and when the end use was
comparable, no preference or higher priority would be given to export license applica-
tions from foreign purchasing missions than to applicants from the trade.2 s This
restored the American private exporters to business, for up to that time, a foreign
government purchasing mission's application would have been given priority auto-
matically.
President Roosevelt, in September 1944, showed his concern for private traders'
sensibilities when he released an instruction that after the defeat of Germany, the
Foreign Economic Administration "should relax controls over exports to the fullest
extent compatible with our continuing war objectives . . . with a view to en-
couraging private trade without interfering with the successful prosecution of the
war against Japan." This concern had been fortified by the apparent desire of
some governments to carry on bulk buying or to centralize imports in other forms
in the postwar period.
" See HENRY CHAxmEs, WORLD TADE PoLIcIEs: THE CHANGING PANO AMA, 1920-1953, at 304
0 I953)."" Id. at 3o6. 28 ibid. ID d. at 3 10.
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Bulk purchasing had emerged during the latter half of 1944 in fields unrelated
to the war3 The United Kingdom announced the conclusion of long-term con-
tracts with the governments of Australia and New Zealand for the bulk purchase of
the entire exportable surpluses of meats and dairy products of those countries. The
arrangements were to run for from two to four years3 1 Nearly similar arrangements
were made with Canada, and the British Ministry of Food announced that it con-
templated extending this policy to Argentina and other South American countries.
The reason was given that the United Kingdom Government was making these
bulk-purchase agreements "as part of its policy for safeguarding food supplies for
the United Kingdom for the next few years." The British policy was being opposed,
however, by some Englishmen because they thought that it would perpetuate un-
desirable principles of commercial policy at a time when it was unnecessary to replace
private firms and competitive importation by governmental operations.
The United States showed its irritation with such a prolongation of state trading
by a letter of President Roosevelt, dated September 29, x944,2 in which the Presi-
dent directed that in view of the curtailment to be made in war production after
the defeat of Germany, plans should be initiated for
an appropriate cut in the foreign procurement program for strategic and critical materials
needed in the prosecution of the war. The adjustment to this reduced program should
be made in such a way as to prevent undue and unnecessary financial losses to American
taxpayers, to best preserve our foreign relations and to strengthen the foundation for a
high level of international trade in the future.
In spite of these protestations, the fact remained that during 1945, the last year
of the war, the great bulk of purchases made in the United States by most of the
countries of continental Europe was made through the purchasing missions, some-
times as the agents of governmental centralized buying agencies in their home
capitals and sometimes as coordinators and expediters of orders of private merchants
in their homelands who negotiated the purchases with American private traders
but then needed help in obtaining export licenses in Washington.
True to its promise to the American foreign trade fraternity, the United States
Government, in May 1946, prepared an order "3 to be presented to the foreign gov-
ernment purchasing commissions of Australia, Belgium, China, France, Greece, India,
Italy, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Union of South
Africa, the Soviet Union, and the United Kingdom asking them to limit their opera-
tions during a transitional period to the procurement of essential civilian commodi-
ties. They were to utilize normal trade channels to the maximum extent possible
and to bring their purchasing methods into accord with commercial considerations.
After the transitional period, they were to liquidate.
30 See ENxE & SALERA, op. cit. supra note x5, at 443-46.
"'See HENRY CHwA.LmEs, WORLD TRADE PoLIciEs: THE CHANGING PANORAMA, 1920-1953, at 326
(1953).
"rId. at 327.
"' See Release of May 4, 1946, 14 DEPT STATE BULL. 859 (1946).
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The Secretary of State called each group of officials in turn to tell them of the
policy decision and to present them with an aide memoire. In the case of the Soviet
Government, since it was obvious that the Soviet Government would not abandon
its state monopoly of foreign trade, the communication added that it was presumed
that the Soviet Government would continue to conduct its commercial operations
through a centralized agency, but that the United States Government desired that
"trade between the United States and the U.S.S.R. should again be carried on by an
agency or agencies incorporated in one of the states of the United States as was
the case prior to the war."
American policy, in short, required return to the prewar pattern of commercial
relations, even for the Soviet Union; and for the latter, it would have to channel
its purchases and sales through an agency having the form of a private corpora-
tion. Within a short time, The Amtorg Trading Corporation was required to
register as an agent of the Soviet Government under the terms of the Alien
Registration Act. 4 This identified it as governmental and provided special controls,
atlhough it gave it no rights to claim sovereign immunity.
It seemed in i946, for the moment, as if state trading could be pushed back to
its prewar status; but this was not to be. The various East European states, as
they were brought successively securely within the Soviet orbit, declared their
policy to be that of state trading. One of these, Czechoslovakia, had become a
charter member of GATT in 1947 before this policy had been enunciated, and
so there was a monopoly state trader within the framework of an organization
primarily composed of private traders who permitted themselves to conduct some
state trading, but only on a marginal basis.
The expansion of the Soviet-influenced world was bad enough to private enter-
prisers, but the real blow was to fall from the hands of the private-enterprise coun-
tries themselves, for by i95i, an economist was able to write, "The total amount of
the world's trade that is carried on directly by governments is substantial, even if
we exclude that of the socialized states. ' 5 He noted that the United States was
the only major wheat-exporting country not having a government-trading monopoly
in wheat, and that bulk-purchasing agreements were being utilized by governments
to acquire agricultural and numerous other types of commodities, especially raw
materials important in the country's economy. He noted further that when nationali-
zation of industry occurred, as it had occurred in the United Kingdom in the coal
mines, the railways, and the steel industry, purchase and sale were necessarily through
state agencies, and there was no reversal of the trend toward state trading to be
expected in this area.
No more controversial agency engaged in such activity was to be found than the
Argentine Trade Promotion Institute (IAPI). Until its recent liquidation, it con-
ducted the importation of equipment for the state-owned oil business, railways, and
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other enterprises. It also served as the import agency for the state monopoly of rub-
ber, tinplate, oil, and coal. Its export operations involved purchase of agricultural
products from Argentine farmers at low prices for resale on the markets abroad at
world prices. It is even alleged that 'its position was strengthened by preferential
exchange-rate terms on some of its transactions. 36 This position had aroused the
hostility of foreign private firms attempting to sell in the Argentine market.
The nationalization policies of the United Kingdom and of France have worried
another economist,3 7 and he has concluded that World War II is bound to have had
a more disturbing effect upon the world economy and international trade than
World War I. He doubted that the defeated countries of Italy, Germany, and
Japan would avoid state control over their economic affairs. He felt that in the
countries occupied during the war, the struggle to wipe out unemployment would
tempt even the governments firmly committed to private enterprise to assume un-
precedented control over business activities and even, on occasion, to take a direct
hand in matters affecting foreign trade. He reported that because of these develop-
ments, many are of the opinion that the trend toward direct government control
over foreign trade is irresistible and that there is no alternative but to accept national
controls over foreign trade. He related this to his conclusion that people are no
longer willing to suffer persistent depression and mass unemployment passively, so
that governments will find themselves forced to take every reasonable and even
heroic. measures to combat economic depression, on pain of receiving short shrift
at the hands of the masses.
This pessimistic view from the point 6f view of the private traders is shared by
other economists. One thought in i95o that the outgrowth of the industrial revolu-
tion had made apparent the need for action in the public interest, sometimes in the
form of regulation and control, sometimes in the form of a laying down of rules
for private enterprise, and elsewhere in the form of goods and services provided by
the government itself 8 He expected that no theory would underly such extension,
except in areas falling under the influence of the Soviet Union, but that in the pri-
vate-enterprise countries, the extension would be made on pragmatic grounds. In
short, to muddle through a crisis, government would take into its hands economic
activity, and by degrees, there would be built up increasing areas of state enterprise,
including state trading.
To those who view matters in this way, the report of James Reston, that to meet
Soviet economic penetration of areas of the world in which Americans have hoped
to see political and economic development along the lines of liberal democracy, the
United States is beginning to feel the necessity of recreating the United States Com-
mercial Corporation or some similar agency, is alarming. To meet the threat ex-
pressed by Soviet state-trading agencies, the United States sees the necessity of
"0 See ENKF & SALERA, Op. cit. supra note 15, at 306.
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creating its own. It is a narrow opening to which attention of this nature is now
being given, but it cannot but cause fears that through the crack in the door, the
wolf may squeeze.
Without a theory like Lenin's, and to cause the containment of that theory to
such parts of the world as presently accept it, the United States, as the arch defender
of the private trader, seems to feel itself impelled to adopt the instruments of the
hostile theory. Will adoption lead to the final victory of state trading, at least in
primary essentials, throughout the world? That is the question posed to the
exasperated government officials in Washington as they seek to meet the Soviet
successes. They want none of what might follow, but they would like to have a
stronger weapon to use in their campaign against the expansion of Soviet influence.
If they weaken their position against state trading for this utilitarian purpose, can
they argue against the bulk purchasing of their allies of the private-enterprise world?
In the answers to these questions lies the future of state trading, and with it, the
future of private-enterprise commercial relations. This question is posed at a time
when conservative governments have been re-emerging in various parts of the
world previously thought to be moving toward socialism. The steel industry in
Britain has been returned to private hands, as has road transport. France under De
Gaulle may have less socialist influences governing her future. West Germany, Italy,
and Japan have not moved totally in the direction of state enterprise anticipated soon
after the war by the economist cited above. The Eisenhower administration has
done much to check governmental development of domestic resources in the United
States. To some, the tide toward socialization of the economy seems to have turned,39
and with it, the possible spread of state trading has seemed less likely than a decade
ago. Yet, following upon these reversals of expectation, comes the thought of using
Soviet-type weapons to fight Soviet expansion, and the matter is thrown out of
balance again. Even without such a possibility, the discussion of the problems set
forth in the articles to follow would be crucial to an understanding of the functioning
of an important segment of the foreign trade of the world. With such a possibility,
the articles take on new importance of unpredictable magnitude.
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